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Abstract: This article belongs to the game theoretic and information eco-
nomics literature dealing with the problem of signaling in the context of game
theoretical models of entry into the industry. As opposed to the majority of lit-
erature we consider the situation of asymmetric information where the private
information belongs to the entrant. We model the capacity decision of the en-
trant as a signal of his strength. We show that in the Stackelberg model of market
entry for some values of underlying parameters the entrant fully utilizes his ca-
pacity while for other parameter values he builds excess capacity. The model
may be empirically relevant for industrial organization analysis of the entry of a
new supplier to the existing supply chain.
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JEL classification: D43, D82, L13.
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1 Introduction
This article belongs to the game theoretic and information economics literature
dealing with the problem of signaling. The beginnings of the formal modeling of
signaling are connected with the Spence’s (1973) model of job-market signaling,
which was eventually rewarded by Nobel prize in economics for the analysis of
markets with asymmetric information in in 2001. In this model the major idea
of signaling — the informed player takes some costly action to signal his private
information to uninformed player — was introduced to the wide mainstream
economic audience for the first time. Almost ten years later Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) applied this idea to the analysis of industry entry in the theory of industrial
organization.
The Milgrom and Roberts (1982) analysis of entry was connected with the
notion of limit pricing. The firm engaged in limit pricing purposely reduces
its profits by not allowing its price to be higher than ex-ante specified limit
value in order to deter entry by firms which are not active in the market so
far. The seminal modern limit pricing model of Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
is a signaling model. In this model the incumbent firm has high or low cost.
Only the incumbent firm knows whether its cost are high or low. The possible
entrant is willing to enter the industry only if the incumbent is a high cost one
because the subsequent competition with the low cost incumbent would lead to
the negative profit for the entrant. Obviously, in order to have interesting non-
trivial situation, we assume that the competition with the high cost incumbent
will provide positive profit for the entrant. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) show
that while in the absence of possible entry, the low cost incumbent would charge
a lower price than the high cost incumbent, the possibility of the entry leads to
the following situation: The high cost incumbent may wish to pretend that he is
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the low cost one by charging less than the monopoly price of the high cost firm.
Or, if entrant believes that high cost firm might charge low prices, the low cost
incumbent may need to signal its identity by charging so low a price that would
be unprofitable for a high cost incumbent. This is a standard approach in the
signaling models — the informed efficient party engages in the costly action (low
price in our case) which would be prohibitively costly to the inefficient party. In
any way, some type of incumbent is using limit pricing in the Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) model. We should emphasize that the informed party in the Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) model is the incumbent. This approach with informed incumbent
and uninformed entrant is used in the huge literature inspired by that model.
As pointed out by Riley (2001), there are no well known signaling models
dealing with the use of capacity decision as a signal of strength (low unit cost)
of an entrant in market entry games of industrial organization. Therefore our
paper aims to fill this gap in the industrial organization game theoretic literature
dealing with the signaling games in the context of industry entry. Our paper
provides a model of industry entry where a capacity decision is made by the
informed entrant prior to entering the market. We show that for some values of
underlying parameters the strength of an entrant can be revealed by the different
choices of capacities between weak and strong entrants.
The model may be empirically relevant for industrial organization analysis
of the entry of a new supplier to the existing supply chain. Our paper could
be also considered as belonging to an international agricultural trade literature
on the use of agricultural commodities quotas since the capacity decision can be
also interpreted as a choice of import quota or voluntary export restraint. Our
model is relevant for trade in both raw agricultural (or any other) commodities
and for processed food industry products (or for other products on any stage of
production vertical chain).
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2 The Literature Review
The problem of capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry is very rigorously
analysed by Allen, Deneckere, Faith, and Kovenock (2000), who, similarly as
we do in our paper, reject often assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry
game. Their paper studies a model in which the incumbent and entrant sequen-
tially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price. Their approach
produces a simple and intuitive set of equilibrium behaviors and generates clear
prediction about when these different outcomes are likely to arise. The entry de-
terrence is also analysed by Bagwell and Ramey (1996), Cave and Salant (1995),
and Maskin (1999) on a very sophisticated theoretical level. A more empirical
approach is taken by Krishna and Tan (1992, 1999) or Harris (2007).
Our model is also relevant to the international trade literature. In the theory
of strategic trade policies, the often raised question is the construction of optimal
tariffs or quotas in the asymmetric environment. The capacity variable used in
our model may be interpreted as the quota size or the tariff level negotiated in
the strategic trade policy framework. One possible approach to the analysis of
the strategic trade is presented by Zigic (2005) . His book is primarily concerned
with the trade between industrialized North and less industrialized South in the
environment characterized by information asymmetry. Among other sources of
asymmetry Zigic (2005) considers the difference in the unit cost of production,
which is the same approach as we use in our paper. Given this asymmetry, Zigic
(2005) explores some properties of optimal strategic trade policy as well as its
sensitivity and its social welfare implications with respect to different modes of
competition, possible information asymmetry and variations in ability of gov-
ernment to precommit to its policy choice. As opposed to our model, where we
consider just the competing firms without any government intervention, he is very
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much concerned with the role of government. He relaxes the standard assumption
that the government can commit to its policy instrument prior to the strategic
action of the domestic firm based on the reason that governments and firms are
likely to differ in their ability to commit to future actions. Thus, the government
may lack credibility with the firms whose behavior it tries to influence. There
may also be a time lag between the announcement and implementation of the
strategic trade policies. As a consequence, the government may be forced to
select its policy only after the strategic choice of domestic firm. This gives a
strategic motive to the domestic firm to influence or manipulate the government
policy response. In such a situation, it has been claimed that implementing a
strategic trade policy can cause inefficiencies and consequently can lead to lower
social welfare as compared to the corresponding social welfare under free trade.
The problem of market entry is a frequently analysed topic in the agricultural
economics literature, especially in connection with the modeling of agricultural
and food industry vertical commodity chains. Duponcel (1998) and Frohberg
and Hartmann (1997) are interested in the problems of agricultural trade in
European transition economies, which are very much plagued by entry barriers
and information asymmetries with respect to their target markets. Analogical
situation is in the developing economies as described by Faini, de Melo, and
Takacs (1992). Similar problems also arise in the developed market economies as
documented by McCorriston (1996) and Paarlerg and Lee (2001) in the context
of US agricultural markets and by Veeman (1997) in the Canadian agricultural
marketing board situation.
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3 The Model
We consider a market for a homogeneous good with the inverse demand function
P (Q) =

a−Q if Q < a,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where P (Q) is the market clearing price when the aggregate quantity on the
market is Q and a > 0.
The market is served by an incumbent monopolist (firm 1), who produces the
profit maximizing quantity
q1 =
a− c1
2
= k1, (2)
where c1 is his cost per unit of production and k1 is his production capacity.
We next introduce an entrant (firm 2) which can produce the same homoge-
neous good. His unit cost is cL or cH , where 0 < cL < cH < c1. The incumbent
does not know the entrant’s unit cost.
The incumbent and the entrant play a game with the following sequence of
steps:
1. The entrant builds the production capacity ki, i ∈ {L,H} with a variable
capacity cost γ ≥ 0 per unit of capacity.
2. The incumbent produces q1 as a Stackelberg leader.
3. The entrant of type i produces qi as a Stackelberg follower.
4. Given Q = q1 + qi, the price is determined by equation (1).
The variable capacity cost is in addition to a possible fixed capacity cost. The
marginal capacity cost will be zero if the cost of capacity is fixed and does not
change with the capacity size. This case is particularly applicable to the trade
quota interpretation of the model.
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Throughout the whole paper we assume that the values of the parameters of
the model are such that the complete information production of a Stackelberg
leader facing a low cost entrant without any capacity restriction is positive. This
is satisfied when
a+ cL − 2c1 > 0. (3)
Since we are interested in the problem of signaling by entrant, not in the problem
of entry deterrence, we set the fixed capacity cost for the entrant equal to zero.
4 Complete Information Case
As derived by Saloner (1985) in a similar game, the capacity constraint induces
different production quantities than in the unconstrained Stackelberg game.
We will use the following notation: For i ∈ {L,H}, qD1i is an equilibrium
quantity chosen by an incumbent facing an entrant of type i; qDi and ki are an
equilibrium quantity and capacity chosen by entrant of type i. The quantity
produced by a Stackelberg leader followed by an entrant of the type i in the
model without capacity constraint is denoted as qS1i.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium quantities when the incumbent knows the type of the
entrant with certainty and the variable cost of capacity are zero are:
qD1i =
a+ ci − 2c1
2
√
2
< qS1i (4)
qDi = a− c1 − 2qD1i =
(
√
2− 1)a− ci + (2−
√
2)c1√
2
= ki. (5)
Proof: See Saloner (1985).
We will assume throughout this paper that the capacity unit cost γ is low
enough to allow Stackelberg follower’s outcome for both low and high cost entrant.
That is, we assume
piSH = (q
S
H)
2 − qSHγ ≥ 0, (6)
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which leads to the following upper bound on a unit variable cost of capacity:
γ ≤ γ¯ = qSH =
a+ 2c1 − 3cH
4
. (7)
Proposition 1 Let γ ≤ γ¯. Then in the complete information equilibrium with
unit capacity cost γ the capacities and outputs are the same as with zero unit cost
of capacity.
Proof: It follows from Lemma 1 and from the following properties of the entrant’s
profit function. For all γ ≤ γ¯ and for all qi ∈ [qSi , qDi ], i ∈ {L,H}, the net profit
piki of the entrant of the type i is increasing in qi. For all γ ≤ γ¯ the profit piDi of
the entrant of the type i at the equilibrium production (qD1i , q
D
i ) net of capacity
unit cost is nonnegative. For all γ ≤ γ¯ piDi ≥ piSi .
Q.E.D.
The profits in the equilibrium are:
piD1i = pi
S
1i = (q
D
1i)
2 (8)
for the incumbent facing an entrant of type i and
piDi = q
D
i (a− qD1i − qDi − ci − γ) (9)
for the entrant of type i.
In the following analysis of the imperfect information game we assume that
the values of all parameters are such that the full information equilibrium given
by (4) and (5) is feasible.
5 Incomplete Information Case
We check under which range of capacity unit cost γ the full information equilib-
rium survives as a separating equilibrium in the signaling game with the entrant’s
private information about his variable cost ci.
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Lemma 2 The incentive compatibility of the complete information outcome is
satisfied for the high cost entrant if the variable capacity cost is sufficiently high
such that γ ≥ γ1, where
γ1 =
1√
2(cH − cL)
[(2√2− 1)a− 2√2cH − cL + 2c1
4
√
2
]2
− (10)
((
√
2− 1)a− cH + (2−
√
2)c1)√
2
(a− (2√2− 1)cH + 2(
√
2− 1)c1)
2
√
2
]
.
Proof: The incentive compatibility is satisfied if
piDH ≥ RH(qD1L)[a− qD1L −RH(qD1L)− cH ]− qDL γ, (11)
where piDH is given by an equation (9) and Ri(q1) is the best response of the entrant
of type i to the quantity q1.
After the substitutions for quantities and some algebraic manipulations this
leads to the condition in Lemma (2).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 The incentive compatibility of the complete information outcome is
satisfied for the low cost entrant if the variable capacity cost is sufficiently low
such that γ ≤ γ2, where
γ2 =
(2
√
2− 2)a− (2−√2)cL +
√
2CH + (6− 4
√
2)c1
4
. (12)
Proof: Incentive compatibility is satisfied for a low cost entrant if
piDL ≥ qDH [a− qDH −R1(qDH)− cL − γ], (13)
where piDL is given by equation (9).
After the substitutions for quantities and some algebraic manipulations this
leads to the condition in Lemma (3).
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Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 Let γ1 ≤ γ ≤ min{γ2, γ¯}. Then there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the entry game in which capacities and outputs are the same as
under a complete information.
Proof: The incentive compatibility of the proposed equilibrium is satisfied by
Lemmata (2) and (3). The perfectness of the equilibrium is supported by follow-
ing off the equilibrium path actions of the incumbent:
qS1L if k > kL, (14)
qS1H if k ∈ (kH , kL), (15)
R1(k) if k < kH , (16)
which are sequentially rational given the following beliefs of the incumbent:
i = L if k ≥ kL, (17)
i = H if k ∈ [kH , kL), (18)
any beliefs if k < kH . (19)
Q.E.D.
While the impossibility of a separation for γ ∈ (γ2, γ¯] happens only for some
values of parameters for which γ2 < γ¯, the problem of a separation for γ < γ1 is
a more fundamental issue. In our model, it is not possible for a low cost entrant
to ensure a separation by simply increasing the capacity. For any increase of
a capacity over kL = q
D
L the optimal response of an incumbent with a belief
that he is facing the low cost entrant leads to Stackelberg equilibrium quantities.
Nevertheless, there is still a possibility for separation if the low cost entrant
obtains his Stackelberg outcome and the high cost entrant obtains the same
outcome as under a complete information.
10
Lemma 4 Let the produced quantities be (qS1L, q
S
L) if the incumbent believes that
he is facing the low cost entrant and (qD1H , q
D
H) if the incumbent believes that he
is facing the high cost entrant. Let qS1L = a − cH − 2
√
piDH + γ(kL − kH) and
qS1L = a − cL − 2
√
piL(qD1H , RH(q
D
1H)) + γ(kL − kH). Then for all qS1L ∈ [qS1L, qS1L]
each type of entrant is willing to reveal his type.
Proof: The incentive constraint for the low cost entrant is satisfied if
piSL − γkL ≥ piL(qD1H , RH(qD1H))− γkH , (20)
from which we obtain
qS1L ≤ qS1L = a− cL − 2
√
piL(qD1H , RH(q
D
1H) + γ(kL − kH). (21)
The incentive constraint for the high cost entrant is satisfied if for a given qS1L
piDH − γkH ≥ piH(qS1L, RH(qS1L))− γkL, (22)
which is satisfied for all qS1L such that
qS1L ≥ qS1L = a− cH − 2
√
piDH + γ(kL − kH). (23)
Q.E.D.
Since piL(q
D
1H , RH(q
D
1H)) > pi
D
H and square root is a concave function, the re-
laxation effect of unit capacity cost γ is bigger than its restrictive effect. This
means that the increase in unit capacity cost makes the separation of high and
cost entrants easier.
Proposition 3 For all γ < γ1 and for all q
S
1L ∈ [qS1L, qS1L], there exists a perfect
Bayesian separating equilibrium in which both types of entrant obtain the same
import capacity ki as under a full information and the low cost entrant does not
fully utilize his capacity.
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Proof: This equilibrium is given by the following strategies and beliefs:
The strategy of an entrant is: entrant of type i plays k = ki.
The strategy of an incumbent is:
qS1L if k ≥ kL, (24)
qS1H if k ∈ (kH , kL), (25)
qD1H if k = kH , (26)
R1(k) if k < kH . (27)
This strategy can be supported by the following beliefs of an incumbent:
i = L if k ≥ kL, (28)
i = H if k ∈ [kH , kL), (29)
any beliefs if k < kH . (30)
Q.E.D.
In the cases when the separating equilibrium with full information capacities
is not possible, the incumbent and the entrant can play a pooling perfect Bayesian
equilibrium with the capacity and production equal to the full information out-
come of the high cost entrant qDH .
6 Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to use the capacity (or import quota or voluntary
export restraint) as a signal of the strength of the entrant. However, in the case of
a Stackelberg market entry game this signaling is restricted by the discontinuity
in a payoff for an entrant. This discontinuity is caused by an incumbent reacting
by his Stackelberg quantity to any increase in the capacity over the complete
information equilibrium level for a given type of an entrant.
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